

USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

SMALL-SCALE CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS AND THE ARMY NATIONAL GUARD

by

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ABSTRACT

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Since the end of the Cold War and the emergence of the Total Force concept, the Army has continued to emphasize increased reliance on the Army National Guard for small-scale contingencies (SSC). From 1989 to the present, the Army National Guard has responded to over 45 contingency operations with soldiers currently deployed to Southwest Asia, Bosnia, and Kosovo in support of SSC operations. In addition, the U.S. Army announced that the National Guard would assume the support requirement for Bosnia through 2005 and continue supporting Multinational Force Observers (MFO) Sinai and Southwest Asia Operation Desert Spring (ODS). While these missions have validated the "Total Force" concept and provided valuable operational experience, they are beginning to show negative trends in unit readiness, employer support, and family issues. The challenge of the Army National Guard is to successfully execute SSC missions over the long term. How can the Army National Guard organize National Guard forces to handle these deployments and reduce the negative issues on employers and families?

The purpose of this paper is to determine how the Army National Guard can be effectively deployed to support SSC missions while minimizing the negative impacts of deployment. This paper briefly describes the history of the Army National Guard's mobilizations from the Vietnam War through the early 1990's; it reviews the reasons for the increased dependence on the Army National Guard; and it explores the negative and positive issues created by increased reliance. Finally, given the significant demand for Army National Guard forces, this paper offers a recommendation designed to reduce the negative issues arising from SSC deployments and help ensure that the Army National Guard is capable of maintaining overall readiness to meet the challenges of the nation's future security.

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SMALL-SCALE CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS AND THE ARMY NATIONAL GUARD

“A force missioned across the spectrum of contingencies, structured and resourced to accomplish its mission, capable and accessible when called, with trained citizen-soldiers committed to preserving the timeless traditions and values of service to our nation and communities.”¹

—National Guard Vision Statement

Since the end of the Cold War, and IAW the National Military Strategy policy of engagement, the demand for the Army to participate in small-scale contingencies (SSC) has remained high. Between 1993 and 2000, the Army engaged in over 170 separate SSCs, ranging from humanitarian assistance to peacekeeping operations, averaging 20 and 30 deployments a month.² While conducting these operations, the Army force structure was downsizing, budgets were reducing and operational tempo was increasing. Consequently, the Army turned to the Army National Guard (ARNG) to support the SSC operations around the world. Since 1993, the Army National Guard has responded to over 45 contingency operations with soldiers currently deployed to Southwest Asia, Bosnia, and Kosovo in support of the Army. In addition, the U.S. Army announced that the National Guard would assume the entire support requirement for Bosnia through 2005, while continuing to provide support for the Multinational Force Observers (MFO) Sinai and Southwest Asia Operation Desert Spring (ODS) SSCs.

While these SSC missions have validated the “Total Force” concept, relieved current Army operational tempo, and provided valuable realistic operational experience, they are beginning to produce negative trends in unit readiness, employer support, and family issues. Given the necessity and importance for the Army National Guard involvement in SSC missions, the key is to determine how the Army National Guard can best execute these missions over the long term. How can the Army National Guard organize forces to handle these deployments and reduce the negative issues on readiness, employers, and families.

The purpose of this paper is to determine how the Army National Guard can be effectively deployed to support SSC missions while minimizing the negative impacts of deployment. This paper describes the history of the Army National Guard mobilizations from the Vietnam War through the early 1990’s; it reviews the reasons for the increased reliance on the Army National Guard; and it explores the negative and positive issues created by this increased reliance. Finally, given the significant demand for Army National Guard forces, this paper offers a recommendation designed to reduce the negative issues arising from SSC deployments. This

recommendation will help ensure that the Army National Guard is capable of maintaining overall readiness to meet the challenges of the nation's future security.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The Vietnam War was a turning point for the Army National Guard. One of the greatest tragedies of the war is that the Army fought it alone. The President of the United States and Secretary of Defense made a conscious decision not to mobilize the National Guard. President Johnson's refusal was apparently motivated by reluctance to spread the effects of the Vietnam War across the country.³ The philosopher Carl von Clausewitz wrote, "War can not be divorced from political life; and whenever this occurs in our thinking about war, the main links that connect the two elements are destroyed and we are left with something pointless and devoid of sense."⁴ Instead, with minimal exceptions, the Army fought the Vietnam War deploying over 3.5 million soldiers compared to the twenty thousand reserved component soldiers mobilized.⁵ As a result of President Johnson's decision, the Army turned to civilians for its manpower and consequently, the Army fought the Vietnam War as a draftee Army.⁶

In 1965, Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara and the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) recommended calling up 235,000 Army National Guard and Army Reserve soldiers.⁷ It was the military and political considerations that drove the recommendation to call-up the reserve components. JCS Chairman General Earle G. Wheeler stated, "We felt it would be desirable to have a reserve call-up in order to make sure the people of the United States knew that we were in a war and not engaged at some two-penny military adventure."⁸

President Johnson overruled the recommendation and announced the increase of monthly draft notices from 17,000 to 35,000. The President said "It was not essential to order reserve component units into service now."⁹ President Johnson's decision was an attempt to fight the war behind the political scenes without admitting he was fighting a war.¹⁰ Brigadier General Michael W. Davidson, former Adjutant General of the Kentucky National Guard, described calling up the National Guard and Reserve as "a political sound barrier, one that Johnson was not willing to break."¹¹

The failure to call-up the Army National Guard had serious repercussions in the United States. The fact that reserve component soldiers were not mobilized contributed to civilian opposition to the Vietnam War. Certainly, many more families, along with virtually every town and city in the United States would have been affected by a call-up. By mobilizing the National Guard, soldiers fighting the war would have represented the economic, political, and social strata in most American communities, and served as a litmus test of the political will of the

nation.¹² President Johnson consciously avoided that test, to the long-term detriment of America's commitment to the war.¹³

Unlike the Gulf War, communities had no hometown units overseas to support. Although many communities had soldiers who served in Vietnam, the sense of community involvement in the war effort undoubtedly would have been heightened had the National Guard and Army Reserve units been deployed.¹⁴ Mobilization of the reserve components would have sparked national debate on the whole issue of support for the war.¹⁵ Because of a reluctance to spread the effects of the war throughout the United States population, President Johnson neglected to activate the reserve components. President Johnson's decision was an attempt to fight the war on a low-key basis without major escalation within the country.¹⁶ Certainly, many more families, along with virtually every town and city in the United States would have been affected by a call-up of any proportion. A much different class cross section and a greater political impact would have resulted had he called up the National Guard and not depended on draftees.¹⁷

Moreover, the failure to call upon America's citizen soldiers deprived the military of the training and skills that the National Guard practiced during peacetime.¹⁸ General Bruce Palmer, who served as the commander of U.S. Army Vietnam and later as Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, has written that the failure to mobilize the reserve components contributed greatly to the emasculation of the U.S. Army, as a fighting force.¹⁹

At the end of the Vietnam War, General Creighton W. Abrams stated that "The United States should never again undertake a war of significant proportions without calling the National Guard and Reserve" and that "It was only with this commitment from grass roots America that public opinion and support can be solidified."²⁰ This philosophy was instrumental in influencing the future military strategy and the "Total Force Concept."

The total force concept was born from President Nixon's administration policy, conceived in 1970 and formally adopted as national security policy of 1973. The total force concept grew not only out of the Vietnam experience, but also with the end of the draft and the decline of the defense budget. In 1970, Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird moved to rectify the differences between the active and reserve components by directing the Pentagon to include both active and reserve component forces in all planning, programming, manning, equipping and employing forces.²¹ Secretary Laird recognized that the lower peacetime sustaining costs of reserve component units would result in a larger and more effective total force for a given budget.²²

With the end of the draft in 1973, the "Total Force" concept transitioned to a national policy, known as the "Total Force Policy." This policy guaranteed that the U.S. Army would never go to war without the reserve components. The two main points of the policy were to use

the Army National Guard as the primary augmentation force for the Army and to plan the integration of all forces available to include civilians and allies. Under the "Total Force Policy," the reserve component picked up routine missions and additional responsibilities from the Army. As the Army National Guard began to receive missions, equipment and funding, their relevance for the war planning efforts significantly increased.

Throughout the remainder of the 1970's, considerable discussion was devoted to the Total Force Policy, but the actual integration of the Army and the Army National Guard remained incomplete. The Army established the Affiliation Program and CAPSTONE program to improve the training and readiness of Army National Guard combat battalions and brigades by associating them with active Army units. Under these programs, active Army divisions formed training relationships with Army National Guard units and worked with them during their annual training and inactive duty training weekends. In 1978, under the Division Partnership Program, the Army linked two active divisions with two Army National Guard divisions to increase the readiness of Army National Guard divisions.²³ Also established during this period was the "Round-Out" program that placed designated Army National Guard brigades as the third combat brigade to active divisions stationed in the United States. In 1976, National Guard Bureau (NGB) designated three combat brigades as "Round-Out" organizations. By the beginning of the Desert Storm campaign, seven brigades participated in the program. The Army expected the roundout brigades to train closely with their parent divisions, compliment their force structure, and go to war with the divisions.

The Cold-War era officially ended in the early 1990's with the falling of the Berlin Wall and the demise of communism in Europe. It also was a period of substantial increase in military defense spending for the Army and the Army National Guard. The National Guard received large portions of the defense funds to purchase new equipment and soldier professional education. In 1982, Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger issued a memorandum known as the "first to fight, first to equip" policy. This policy would authorize early deploying Army National Guard units to be equipped at the same time as active Army units. Henceforth, "units that fight first would be equipped first, regardless of component."²⁴ As a result, the Army National Guard readiness improved and ARNG units began to participate in overseas deployments and support operations such as the 1986 Libya operation, Honduras in 1988, and in Operation Just Cause in Panama in 1989.²⁵

In 1990, during Operation Desert Shield and Desert Storm, the Army National Guard played a key role in the successful execution of the war. President Bush invoked (for the first time in this nation's history) the authority under section 673 (b), Title 10, to call 200,000

members of the Army National Guard and Reserve to active duty for up to 180 days.²⁶ The majority of the Army National Guard units that deployed to the Persian Gulf were combat service support and combat support units.

Desert Storm was a true test of the Total Force Policy in hometown America. The Army National Guard proved that combat support and combat service support units could mobilize, deploy, and accomplish their battlefield missions. As General Colin L. Powell, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, stated, the Reserve Components “were vital to the success of the early stages of the operation . . . It is safe to say that without them the swift and efficient deployment of our forces would not have been possible.”²⁷

POST DESERT STORM ENVIRONMENT

“It is DoD policy to place maximum reliance on the National Guard and Reserve units and manpower. We use active units and manpower to support scheduled overseas deployment or sea duty, training requirements, and to support the rotation base, above that level, we plan to support military contingencies with National Guard and Reserve units and manpower when they can be available and ready within planned deployment schedules on a cost effective basis.”²⁸

The collapse of the Soviet Union and a lack of a major enemy threat created a movement by the Government to change the Army from a Cold War force to a smaller streamlined force. Congress and the American people began to see the justification for a force reduction. The early 1990's brought force structure adjustments, unit deactivations, and downsizing of the Army from 750K to 480K. However, the U.S. defense policy of the 1990s called for peacetime engagement and overseas presence. Consequently, the focus of the U.S. military shifted from an attack by the Soviet Union to that of a rising number of territorial disputes, armed ethnic conflicts, and civil wars that posed a significant threat to regional and international peace. This increased demand for military forces in support of peace operations and small-scale contingencies placed a greater emphasis on the Army National Guard. Even as the active Army got smaller, both the Army and Army National Guard found themselves with additional missions requiring support.

The peacetime engagements or SSCs were beginning to be the primary Army operations as directed by defense policymakers in the 1990s, and they began to replace the traditional warfighting operations of the past. The Department of Defense (DoD) described these SSC operations as:

“The full range of military operations short of major theater warfare, including peacekeeping/peace enforcement operations, enforcing embargoes and no-fly zones, evacuating U.S. citizens, reinforcing key allies, neutralizing NBC weapons facilities, supporting counter drug operations, protecting freedom of navigation in international waters, providing disaster relief and humanitarian assistance, coping with mass migration, and engaging in information operations.”²⁹

Not included in this definition are the mission requirements of overseas presence and peacetime engagement activities, which the military often supports. These additional missions dramatically increased the operational tempo (OPTEMPO) of the Army causing a negative impact on readiness and operations and concurrently escalating the nation’s reliance on the Army National Guard.

As part of this change in military strategy, the Army National Guard adjusted their support relationships with the active Army. The 1993 Bottom-Up Review (BUR) shifted national security strategy to a greater dependence on the Army National Guard. To meet the additional missions, the Army National Guard implemented the Enhanced Separate Brigade concept, which replaced the CAPSTONE and Round-Out program.³⁰ This concept designated fifteen Army National Guard brigades as “Enhanced Separate Brigades” (ESBs). These brigades would be structured and resourced to be ready within 90 days of mobilization to reinforce, augment, or backfill active units. The brigades would receive priority for resources, personnel, and equipment, as well as increased training support and opportunities. Modeled after the old “round out” concept, the Army programmed the ESBs as a force multiplier wedge against two nearly simultaneous Major Regional Conflicts (MRC).³¹

In 1994, the Army began to develop a force structure concept that would realign the Army’s roles and missions based on the Army National Guard’s core competencies. Because of this concept, the Army, Army Reserves, and Army National Guard, signed an agreement known as the 1994 Active/Reserve Off-site Agreement.³² This agreement authorized the Army Reserve to pick up the preponderance of early deploying combat support and combat service support units at echelon above Corps level. The Army National Guard retained the preponderance of the combat units with 56 percent of the total combat units in the entire Army force structure, while maintaining a balance of combat support and combat service support units for sustaining various State missions.³³

In 1995, the Commission on Roles and Missions recommended a greater integration and cooperation between the Army’s active and reserve components and commissioned a study, called the Army National Guard Division Redesign Study (ADRS), to review these issues. One of the results of the ARNG ADRS was a proposal to form two integrated warfighting divisions.

Each integrated division would consist of an active component headquarters and three ESBs.³⁴ In addition to the integrated divisions, the proposal reduced the Army's Combat Support (CS), Combat Service Support (CSS) force shortfall by converting 12 ARNG combat brigades, and slice elements from two divisions to the required CS and CSS force structure required for FY's 1999 through 2009.³⁵

The increased demand for soldiers and support capabilities shifted to the Army National Guard as the U.S. Army increased the number of peacekeeping operations. In order to bring soldiers on duty for extended periods of active duty, the President was required to declare a Presidential Select Reserve Call-up (PSRC) (10 USC 673b), which ordered soldiers to active duty for not more than 180 days.³⁶ However, as SSC operations became extended in duration, and successive rotations of Army National Guard soldiers were required, the President proposed to extend the activations to 270 days. In July 1995, DoD Directive 1235.10 changed the involuntary call-up period from 180 to 270 days. Under this new directive, the President, by Executive Order, may augment the active Army to meet operational requirements by calling to active duty up to 200,000 reserve personnel for 270 days.³⁷ The changing of the DoD directive with the extended period of deployment resulted in the Army National Guard being directed to increase their support for peacetime overseas deployments.

Again just two years later, the DoD conducted another review of the Reserve Component force structure mix and roles with the release of the 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) report. The QDR focused on the new defense strategy of Shape-Respond-Prepare and included a greater emphasis on the continuing need to maintain continuous overseas presence in order to shape the international environment and to be better able to respond to a variety of smaller-scale contingencies and asymmetric threats.³⁸ An element of the QDR was the ability to conduct SSC operations simultaneously with Major Theater Wars (MTW). The review highlighted a budget driven reduction in all forces, including a realignment of Army National Guard force structure and missions. The QDR recommendations included Army National Guard and Army Reserve personnel reduction by 45,000 personnel, retaining the 15 ARNG Enhanced Separate Brigades and a reorganization of 12 Army National Guard combat brigades into support brigades.³⁹ The existing force structure plans did not include the Army National Guard in the force mixture to fight the two MTWs scenario. However, the Army did envision that the Army National Guard missions would ease the Army personnel tempo (PERSTEMPO) in small-scale contingencies and the force rotations for extended SSCs.

In addition to the 1997 QDR process, the Secretary of Defense appointed the National Defense Panel (NDP) to review and make recommendations on the QDR. The NDP was also

responsible for providing an assessment of alternative force structures for the U.S. military through 2010. As part of the review, the panel addressed several emerging roles and missions of the Army National Guard. The NDP believed that the Army National Guard would play an increasing role in a variety of military operations worldwide, relieving active units and reducing both OPTEMPO and PERSTEMPO of frequent and lengthy deployments. According to the NDP, the Army National Guard must be prepared and resourced for use in a variety of ongoing SSCs missions around the world.⁴⁰ The suggestions included expanding the Army National Guard's role in the ongoing SSCs, restructuring of the high demand/low density (HD/LD) units to reduce PERSTEMPO, and the assignment of selected units of the Army National Guard at battalion and lower levels to active divisions and brigades.⁴¹

In April 1998, Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen issued the Fiscal Years 2000-2005 Defense Planning Guidance (DPG), which directed the DoD to conduct the Reserve Component Employment Study 2005 (RCE-05). The study reviewed the employment of the Army National Guard and developed several recommendations to enhance their roles in the full range of military missions.⁴² The study suggested that while the Army's involvement in SSCs would be selective, it would continue to remain high over the next 15-20 years. The RCE-05 recommended that the Army National Guard would provide PERSTEMPO relief to the Army and operational skills that are unique to the Guard. The study suggested that the Army National Guard provide additional HD/LD capabilities for SSCs and assume a greater role in sustained operations in Bosnia, MFO, and Southwest Asia.⁴³ The RCE-05 was the first comprehensive study to address the roles, missions, and responsibilities of the Army National Guard and provide a force structure for the future.

USE OF ARMY NATIONAL GUARD FORCES FOR SSC OPERATIONS

Historically, Army National Guard soldiers would train for one weekend a month and two weeks during the summer and could plan to deploy for state or Federal active duty only in the event of a state or national emergency. However, today some 41,000 Army National Guard soldiers have performed duty in Bosnia, and another 7,000 in Kosovo. At present, 1,100 Army National Guard soldiers are in Kosovo, 530 in support of MFO Sinai, and 350 supporting Operation Desert Spring.⁴⁴ In 1989, the Army National Guard used approximately one million duty days. Over the last five years, the Army National Guard has used between 12.5 and 13.5 million duty days per year in support of the Army.⁴⁵

Historically, the President of the United States had the legal authority to call-up the Army National Guard with a Declaration of National Emergency. However, during the Berlin Crisis,

Cuban Missile Crisis, and Vietnam, the presidents did not declare a National Emergency. Nevertheless, in 1976, Congress changed the law and gave the President authorization to call up Army National Guard soldiers for operations other than National Emergencies. These statutory changes in the law became significant when President Bush declared the first Presidential Selected Reserve Call-up (PSRC) for Desert Shield/Desert Storm. (Since 1998, the PSRC has been changed to Presidential Reserve Call-up-PRC.) Since Desert Storm, the President has declared four PRCs. Table 1 depicts the chronology of PRCs.⁴⁶

Conflict	Total National Guard	Remarks
Kosovo (Allied Force) Apr 99 – Present	11,422	Designated a Contingency Opn 24 Apr 99; PRC 27 Apr 99
Iraqi Crisis (Desert Thunder) Oct 97 - Present	15,993	Designated a Contingency Opn 24 Feb 98; PRC 24 Feb 98
Bosnia (Joint Endeavor or Forge or Guardian) Dec 95 – Present	37,007	JE: Dec 95 – Dec 96; JG: Dec 96 – Jun 98; JF: Jun 98 – Present; Designated Contingency Opn 2 Dec 95
Haiti (Support/Uphold Democracy) Sep 94 – Present	8,338	Designated a Contingency Opn 15 Sep 94; PSRC 15 Sep 94
Total PRC Since Opn Desert Storm	72,760	
Kuwait/Iraq (Desert Shield/Storm) Aug 90-91	265,322	Designated a Contingency Opn 22 Aug 90; PSRC 22 Aug 90; Partial MOB 18 Jan 91
*Number of Soldiers is estimated		
Components – ARNG, USAR, USNR, ANG, USAFR, USCGR		

TABLE 1. PRSC AND PRC DEPLOYMENTS

MULTINATIONAL FORCE OBSERVERS (MFO)

In 1993, the Chief of Staff, Army (CSA) directed a study to test the feasibility of recruiting, forming, and deploying Army National Guard volunteers for the six-month MFO peacekeeping battalion.⁴⁷ The MFO force was to observe and report violations of the Egyptian-Israeli Treaty of Peace along the Sinai Peninsula. In the 12-year history of the MFO mission, this was the first time that the task force was composed of Army National Guard and Active Army soldiers. The test battalion was going to conduct the same mission with the same standards as the previous active duty units, but with a different approach to team building, training, and family support requirements.⁴⁸

Activated on 4 November 1994, the task force served a six-month rotation and deactivated on 28 July 1995. The battalion consisted of 80 percent volunteers from the Army National Guard and 20 percent from the active Army. The task force equally divided the Officer

and Noncommissioned Officer (NCO) positions between the two components, leaving the majority of junior enlisted positions to the Army National Guard soldiers.⁴⁹

Despite, the overall success of the MFO deployment and the Active Component/Reserve Component integration, several recommendations surfaced to improve future deployments. The recommendations included sending organic Army National Guard units instead of a composite AC/RC unit, which would enhance unit cohesion and integrity. Shorten the predeployment training time by focusing the training tasks to peacekeeping task only. Finally, limit the number of soldiers taken from individual battalions and expand the pool of volunteers throughout the division to minimize the impact on personnel readiness and family support.⁵⁰

The MFO test proved to be a successful strategy for future deployments of AC/RC soldiers for peacekeeping operations.⁵¹ The overall attitude among the Army National Guard leaders and soldiers who participated in the MFO mission reinforced the concept that readiness and training improve with these deployments. According to the 1996 study, the senior leaders reflected a shift in their perception of the impact on combat readiness, with well over a third of the soldiers reporting a positive impact on the combat readiness of their units after deployment.⁵² The majority of the soldiers and leaders confirmed that while deployed the unit moral improved and endorsed future participation in peacekeeping missions.

OPERATION JOINT FORGE/JOINT GUARDIAN/JOINT ENDEAVOR

The Army National Guard's greatest contributions as a peacekeeping force occurred in the Balkans with the Bosnia mission and later in Kosovo. President Clinton deployed the Army National Guard on 8 December 1995 through PSRC Executive Order 12982. The ARNG mobilized over 2,000 troops in 53 units from 28 states for the initial Bosnia peacekeeping mission.⁵³ Initially, the deployment troop list consisted of HD/LD units and selected volunteers who filled the vacancies caused by the downsizing of the military. From 1996 to 1999, the Army Guard deployed nearly 10,000 peacekeepers to the former Yugoslavia and Macedonia. In March 2000, the Army announced that the Army National Guard would command multinational forces in the U.S. sector of Bosnia for a 270-day rotation. The deployment of 800 soldiers from the 49th Division in Texas was the largest single unit deployment since Operation Desert Storm (ODS) and one of a few times in Army history that a Army National Guard headquarters has commanded active duty forces.

In Bosnia, the 49th Division commanded about 600 additional reserve component forces and 3,200 active duty personnel already assigned in Bosnia. The Division responsibility included managing the multinational operations for Operation Joint Forge with a subordinate

group of soldiers from Denmark, Finland, Norway, Poland, Sweden, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Turkey and Russia.⁵⁴ According to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, the mission is a changing of the guard that characterizes a “point of reality” for DoD’s efforts to create a totally integrated force while coping with the numerous and varied missions being performed throughout the world. “As we look down the road at peacekeeping operations, we understand we have to utilize the total force – and in this case we’re utilizing the Army in its totality.”⁵⁵

OPERATION DESERT SPRING (ODS)

Operation Desert Spring (ODS) is part of an on-going operation established in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia following Operations Desert Storm and Desert Shield. Its mission is to maintain a forward presence, provide control, and force protection over Army forces in Kuwait. The mission for the Army National Guard is to provide security for Patriot Missile Batteries and aviation support to the Operation Intrinsic Action rotations. The deployments are currently five months in duration and combined forces total about 230 soldiers. The ODS missions have provided light infantry companies with an opportunity to train-up, mobilize, deploy, and execute a realistic mission in an actual high threat environment, that otherwise would not be available.

Currently, the reliance on the Army National Guard continues to increase, with over 24,000 ARNG soldiers deployed worldwide in more than 89 countries. These deployments include sending soldiers to peacekeeping operations in the Balkans, Southwest Asia, Operation Joint Forge (Bosnia), Operation Joint Guardian (Kosovo) and Operation Desert Spring (Kuwait/Saudi Arabia). This increase is 12 percent over fiscal year 2001 and 20 percent over the last two years.

ISSUES ARISING FROM SSC PARTICIPATION

While the Army National Guard has become a significant force in the Army’s force structure, there is a limit to how much the ARNG can support SSC operations. The majority of the soldiers in the Army National Guard are soldiers who must balance their duty to country with responsibilities to civilian careers by serving one weekend a month and two weeks annual training during the year. As a result, the Department of the Army must manage the frequency with which it calls on the Army National Guard. Even more important is the need to manage Army National Guard personnel and units sparingly, with limited use of involuntary mobilization. Moreover, the Department of the Army must ensure that they meet the needs of the soldier’s families and civilian employers.

Between fiscal years 1992 and 2001, Army National Guard OPTEMPO increased about 5 percent, from an average of 43.4 to 45.6 days per year.⁵⁶ This increase is over the required 39 days of training a year that Army National Guard soldiers are required by law to complete. While the average OPTEMPO in the Army National Guard has not increased dramatically, individual guardsmen in certain units and occupations have been affected disproportionately. The War on Terrorism (WOT) has led to major increases in Army National Guard participation in addition to the current SSC operations they are supporting in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Southwest Asia.

Between the end of the Gulf War and September 2001, Army National Guard soldiers who voluntarily mobilized under Presidential Reserve Call-ups to support operations in Southwest Asia, Bosnia, and Kosovo, were limited to a maximum of 270 days.⁵⁷ However, the 270-day policy changed on 1 October 2000, back to 179 days to ease the burdens on soldiers, families, and employers.

Currently with the WOT the majority of ARNG soldiers activated were called to active duty involuntarily under the provisions of the Partial Mobilization law. This policy allows the Army to activate Army National Guard soldiers for one year, with the authority to extend the deployment to a second year.⁵⁸ Currently, DoD has extended several Air National Guard security police units for a 2-year mobilization. The impact of both the Presidential Reserve Call-up and the Partial Mobilization could have considerable long-term effects on Army National Guard OPTEMPO, employer support, and family issues. It is conceivable that the Army could take a unit coming off a PRC, turn it around, and involuntarily mobilize them for the War on Terrorism using the stipulations allowed under Partial Mobilization.

FAMILY ISSUES

As the number of SSC missions has increased, so has the potential for family problems. Both Continental United States (CONUS) and Overseas Continental United States (OCONUS) deployments are causing a stress on the Guard family. The Army National Guard has tremendous challenges in supporting families and meeting their personal requirements. While deployments are routine for active duty families, that is rarely the situation for Army National Guard dependents. The military culture is often unfamiliar to Army National Guard families. Some ARNG soldiers may drill in another state, and the nearest military base or support facility for their families may be hundreds of miles or more away.

In many cases, local family support groups are not accessible to Army National Guard families as compared to the Army family support groups. Because the soldiers may come from

throughout the state and region, their families may not have direct access to anyone in the support group, except by mail, telephone or email. Families in need of support either have to drive to the nearest center or request special assistance at their location. In the event of a serious family issue, many of the families do not have a local family support chapter members to assist them with their problems.

Finances and medical care are among the major concerns for Army National Guard families. For many soldiers with successful civilian occupations or businesses, the change in remuneration may be the most dramatic change when switching from civilian to military life. Military pay is often far less than their salary on the outside. Deep cuts in income for many families have forced some soldiers to sell homes or dip into children's college accounts. During Operation Desert Storm, 45 percent of activated Reserve officers and 55 percent of enlisted members reported income loss due to the deployment.⁵⁹ Specifically, the problems were threefold: active duty military income fell below civilian income; additional family expenses associated with military activation placed a burden on the soldier; and some soldiers experienced continuing financial losses after return to civilian life due to neglected business or professional practices.⁶⁰ Families often need advice on how to adjust their lifestyles to cover bills, take advantage of entitlements, read leave-and-earning statements, and compensate for the diminished wages and benefits.

Medical coverage concerns are another major issue. Recalled military members often lose civilian medical and dental coverage, or the medical providers in their area do not accept government medical programs. Currently, the availability of military medical treatment facilities is limited and the TRICARE program is a complex system that is often difficult to understand and access⁶¹

Just as with long hours at their civilian employment, increased duty requirements for deployments are negatively affecting family relationships. Often, spouses of Army National Guard members are concerned that the Army National Guard is a part-time occupation, which is turning into a full-time employment.⁶²

EMPLOYER AND STUDENT ISSUES

Employer support is critical to retention, and accessibility of the Army National Guard for current SSC operations, especially for any planned future taskings. About six percent of the nation's employers have Army National Guard soldiers as their employees. A Pentagon study estimates that approximately one-third of the soldiers who leave the Army National Guard do so because of conflicts with employers. According to LTG Davis, Chief of the National Guard

Bureau, "There is growing awareness that we are 'close to the edge' in abusing and overburdening our civilian employers as we try to meet the demands of our pace of military operations."⁶³ Employers complain about not receiving sufficient advance notice of deployments and a delay in the receipt of mobilization orders. According to Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, Charles Cragin, "It's unfair to employers to take employees away for prolonged or indefinite periods of time, and to do on short notice. Most employers are less interested in receiving compensation for the additional time their employees are gone than they are in being informed well in advance when they are called to active duty."⁶⁴ Many times, soldiers themselves do not receive their orders until a few days before deploying because of the mobilization bureaucracy at higher echelons. For the Army National Guard, alert notifications do not equate to mobilization orders for employers. Often, Army National Guard employees increase the labor cost for employers as they pay overtime premiums to account for the absence of the mobilized soldier. Employers also complain about National Guard soldiers who signed on to successive deployments voluntarily, and their jobs were protected by Federal law. A 1999 DoD survey of employers found that 62 percent considered the absences of their Army National Guard employee too long or inconvenient.

The Uniform Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act (USERRA) prohibit discrimination by a civilian employer against an employee based on the employee's military status.⁶⁵ The Federal law has mandated that soldiers called to active duty and soldiers who voluntarily deploy are entitled to their jobs or equivalent positions upon returning home. In addition, the time they spend on active duty applies to their seniority in their civilian jobs, so they will not lose any of their benefits or pension time.⁶⁶ While most of the employers honor the commitment, there are still soldiers who have filed lawsuits charging employers and the Federal government, with failing to meet their legal obligations. The large companies seem to adjust more easily to deployments than small companies and self-employed soldiers. The toughest burden falls on self-employed professionals. In the case of doctors, many complained the deployments destroyed their practices, so the Army cut the standard nine-month deployment for medical professionals to three months. After Desert Storm, the Pentagon set up an insurance program to protect the part-time troops from lost income, but through poor design and administration, the program collapsed.⁶⁷

Mobilized National Guard college students have problems because there is no Federal statute to protect them against loss of tuition, housing fees, or academic credit. According to former Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, "protecting activated National Guard students is important for recruiting because 30 percent of our guardsmen are college

students.”⁶⁸ The USERRA provides civilian job protection for guardsmen, but there is no similar college education protection. In addition, DoD directive 1250.1 does not expressly task the Employer Support for the Guard and Reserve (ESGR) with mediating disputes between soldiers and their schools.⁶⁹

A major factor in employer support is their lack of knowledge regarding national security issues and the laws pertaining to the mobilization of National Guard soldiers. Employers fully support a mission where there is a clear national interest and a mandated requirement for the Army National Guard to participate. Nevertheless, when SSCs continue over an extended period and the public visibility diminishes; employers begin to question the use of the Army National Guard soldiers verses that of active Army soldiers.

MISSION DURATION ISSUE

The Reserve Component Employment Study 2005 (RCE-05) identified mission duration and rotation policies for non-MTW missions as an area of concern.⁷⁰ The main issue is that one rotation rule may not fit all types of units and soldiers. As of 1 October 2000, the current Army policy is 179-day deployment period for both Army and Army National Guard units.⁷¹ However, for Army National Guard units, the total mobilization period becomes about 230 days. The 179-day policy excludes home station training requirements, mobilization station training, pre-employment training, transit time, demobilization station requirements, and time spent in leave status. Units receive training and funding guidance from NGB instructing them to use their 39 days of weekend drill and annual training to prepare for the mobilization, which in many cases may involve soldiers training multiple weekends in a given month to meet the required training suspense. During the deployment of the 49th Armored Division to Bosnia, the Texas Army National Guard utilized an additional 108 training days over an 18-month period to prepare for its deployment.⁷²

DERIVATIVE UNIT IDENTIFICATION CODES (DUIC) AND VOLUNTEERS

Since the 1995 MFO Sinai rotation, the Army National Guard deployed units in support of SSC operations under a Derivative Unit Identification Code (DUIC), instead of sending the actual unit and its Unit Identification Code (UIC). The Army authorized DUICs usage to assist the ARNG in filling the SSC unit personnel vacancies and satisfy peacetime mobilization requirements. Under the DUIC concept, the unit mobilizes select personnel and equipment from the parent unit, without mobilizing the actual unit's UIC (for example, Aviation Maintenance Company mobilizes a DUIC of three platoons of 156 soldiers, rather than a full company of 215 soldiers). This concept allows organizations to pool volunteers from a variety of organizations

and put them in a unit organization tailored for the mission. The deploying unit's State headquarters transfers the personnel and equipment Modified Table of Organization and Equipment (MTOE) line numbers to a special DUIC document for the deployment. The headquarters transfers the DUIC line numbers back to the original MTOE document, upon returning from the mobilization.

For SSCs, like those in Bosnia, MFO, and ODS, units have been reorganized in order to more closely align the deploying organization to the particular demands of the SSC. The resulting unit looks more like a task force, than a normal unit. Because of this situation, ARNG volunteers have filled the majority of SSCs operations. Under the current mobilization policies, organizations can fill their personnel vacancies with volunteers, which is currently the common practice throughout the Army National Guard.

Even though the use of DUICs and volunteers has advantages, there is recent evidence to demonstrate that continued use of both policies will result in negative consequences in the future. One significant issue is that the potential number of volunteers may begin to decline and therefore future deployments will require the activation of soldiers in an involuntary status.

Another issue involves the reduction of personnel readiness among organizations outside of the deploying unit's command. Every time a soldier volunteers for the deployment from another unit, it reduces the personnel readiness of that unit. In some cases, multiple units can experience a reduction in their personnel readiness on the quarterly Unit Status Report (USR) and possibly drop to a lower overall readiness rating.

The parent unit, which supplies the duty positions for the DUIC unit, must maintain the soldiers' duty position and rank while deployed. The parent units can temporarily backfill the position and recruit new soldiers, but when the deployment is over, the units must place the deployed soldier back into their original pre-deployment duty position. Based off past deployments, many units have experienced leadership difficulties because of the use of the DUIC concept.

Mandatory training requirements for the deployment usually require the deploying soldier to muster with the new unit 6-12 months before the actual deployment. When you add the additional train-up days, deployment, and redeployment time together, the soldier could be away from his parent unit up to 36 months. The longer the requirement, the better chance that issues will begin to surface from the deployment and affect unit readiness.

POSITIVE EFFECTS OF SSC OPERATIONS

A SSC deployment provides vital experience and real-life training to soldiers and units. Each deployment provides the units with the opportunity to improve family member briefings, family support activities, employer interactions and public affairs issues. The increased focus for Army National Guard participation in additional SSC missions has placed greater emphasis on readiness at both the individual and unit levels. Most units notified for potential SSC deployments are directing additional efforts to update personnel information and maintain equipment. In the end, these readiness efforts lead to improved readiness status of the Army National Guard.

Soldiers believe that the readiness and morale of their units increased following an SSC deployment. A 1996 study found that the MFO mission in the Sinai resulted in clear perception among Army National Guard soldiers and leaders that readiness improved because of the deployment.⁷³ By the time, the mission was over and the volunteers had returned to their units, 72% of senior ARNG leaders reported that the volunteers returned better trained.⁷⁴ Additionally, senior leaders reflected a shift in their perception of the impact on combat readiness, with well over a third reporting a positive impact on the post-deployment combat readiness of the their units.⁷⁵

The ARNG cannot overlook the benefits gained from SSC operations. Besides those inherent with mobilization and combat preparedness, Army National Guard soldiers are often able to apply their civilian experience and training to the deployment. The ability of Army National Guard soldiers to adjust quickly to local “civilian attitudes” often assists the SSC leaders’ relationships with local governments and non-government organizations.

PRESIDENTIAL ADMINISTRATION DECISIONS

As the Army National Guard moves into the 21st century, the current deployment situation may change from an emphasis on overseas SSC deployments to homeland security. The current Presidential administration has recently released the 2002 National Security Strategy (NSS), DoD’s draft National Military Strategy (NMS), and the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), which address how the Army will fight in the future. These documents state that the new planning construct to be employed by the military “calls for the force to be sized for defending the homeland, forward deterrence, warfighting missions, and the conduct of small-scale contingency operations.” The guidance does not address any increase in the total size of the force. In addition, Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld has issued an internal memorandum directing that active-duty forces take on many deployment-oriented overseas

missions now assigned to Army National Guard and reserve units. Secretary Rumsfeld “has directed that certain critical skill capabilities be moved from the reserve component into the active component. This is in recognition of the World Trade Center and Pentagon travesty, that we need a new way to rebalance our overseas interests.”⁷⁶ However, until this paradigm shift occurs in the Department of Defense, the Army National Guard will continue to deploy in support of SSC operations.

The current administration has two options to decrease the current deployment situation on the Army National Guard: Either reduce the “demand” overseas by pulling out of selected SSCs or increase the number of Army soldiers. In the current WOT and its associated focus on protecting the homeland, the likelihood of an increase in the “supply” of soldiers is not very likely. This is particularly true with the increased “demand” on the Army and the National Guard to fight terrorism and conduct SSC operations throughout the world. The current administration is working toward reducing the “demand” in the Balkans and MFO Sinai, but it takes time and patience for international political decisions to evolve. Therefore, with the current situation and WOT, the immediate “removal” of the Army National Guard forces from SSC operations does not appear to be a viable option. The real question is whether the Army National Guard is approaching or has already reached the limit of what reserve forces can accomplish. According to DoD Undersecretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, Bernard D. Rostker, “As long as we give the National Guard the flexibility to manage their people and the resources required to get the job done, we have not reached the limit.”⁷⁷

AIR FORCE’S AIR EXPEDITIONARY FORCE (AEF) CONCEPT

The U.S. Air Force developed the Air Expeditionary Force (AEF) concept after a continuous stream of peacekeeping, peace enforcement, and SCC began to show signs of serious personnel strains caused by successive deployments. The Air Force designed the AEF organization to put predictability into deployments by limiting an individual to one three-month deployment during any given 15-month cycle. The Air Force divided the 90 days into six 15-day periods. Volunteers had the option of requesting longer tours in 15-day increments in country, and up to a total of 90 days plus travel days, and would receive priority placement for volunteering for multiple 15-day tours.⁷⁸ The concept was a “Total Force” package including the ANG and the United States Air Force Reserve (USAFR). Because of the AEF concept, both reserve forces are now contributing members to the Total Force actively engaged in operations around the world. According to Bernard D. Rostker, Undersecretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, “The key to using the Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve on missions

such as Northern and Southern Watch, and for peacekeeping in the Balkans, is to give them the flexibility to organize their resources as they see fit.”⁷⁹

PROPOSED DEPLOYMENT ROTATION CONCEPT

The deployment concept proposed in this paper is similar to the AEF concept, in that it reduces the current 179-day deployment requirement to 90 days. Within the 90-day deployment window, units would have the flexibility to rotate personnel in and out of the theater as required. Army National Guard planners would have the option to divide the 90 days into three 30-day periods. The leadership could also have the option of offering 15-day increments in country for select personnel. The key to the deployment window is 30-day increments. Under current legislation, soldiers deployed for more than 30-days are automatically eligible for military health and dental benefits, including their families.

CHANGES NECESSARY FOR IMPLEMENTATION

However, to make this policy effective, the unit rotations would require a three-year schedule and the authorization for deploying units to use their drill and annual training periods to achieve all pre-mobilization requirements. Each deploying headquarters would assume the responsibility to maintain continuity of leadership throughout the three-month deployment, including conducting advance party trips, transition activities, and “right seat ride” opportunities for incoming units and their staffs. Each State Area Command (STARC) headquarters, State Senior Army Advisor, and the appropriate CONUS Army mobilization team would be responsible for completing and validating all mobilization and training requirements, before deploying soldiers into theater. NGB would have responsibility for the long-term tasking of the 8 Army National Guard Divisions and 15 ESBs within the rotation schedules and for providing mobilization funding. Under this type of rotation policy, the Army could integrate their units and soldiers into the rotation schedule at anytime, demonstrating the effectiveness of the seamless integration of Army and National Guard forces.

Currently, the Army National Guard has been deploying soldiers in support of Operation Desert Spring, MFO Sinai, and Bosnia/Kosovo. Each of these deployments has different personnel requirements and missions, but all of the deployments have a 180-day deployment window. Based on the proposed deployment concept, NGB could continue to task those deployments within the Army National Guard Divisions, ESBs, and battalions and still provide them with a long-term deployment approach. In all three examples, the National Guard would remain a viable force to provide forces and equipment in support of any homeland defense mission.

Division Rotation Alternative

(Bosnia/Kosovo – Requirement 1,100 Soldiers)

(Note: Every 4 Years Divisions would receive the mission)

Year 1			
90 Days	90 Days	90 Days	90 Days
Division A	Division A	Division B	Division B
Year 2			
90 Days	90 Days	90 Days	90 Days
Division C	Division C	Division D	Division D
Year 3			
90 Days	90 Days	90 Days	90 Days
Division E	Division E	Division F	Division F

TABLE 2. DIVISION ROTATION ALTERNATIVE

Table 2 depicts how a three-year division rotation to Bosnia/Kosovo could look. Table 3 depicts how a three-year Enhanced Separate Brigade rotation to MFO Sinai could look. Finally, Table 4 depicts how a three-year battalion rotation to Operation Desert Spring could look. In the Division and ESB rotations, every four years, the cycle would repeat itself, the battalion rotations could continue for years without repeating units.

Enhanced Separate Brigade Rotation Alternative

(MFO Sinai – Requirement 530 Soldiers)

(Note: Every 4 Years ESB would receive the mission)

Year 1			
90 Days	90 Days	90 Days	90 Days
ESB A	ESB B	ESB C	ESB D
Year 2			
90 Days	90 Days	90 Days	90 Days
ESB E	ESB F	ESB G	ESB H
Year 3			
90 Days	90 Days	90 Days	90 Days
ESB I	ESB J	ESB K	ESB L

TABLE 3. ENHANCED SEPARATE BRIGADE ROTATION ALTERNATIVE

Battalion Rotation Alternative
(Operation Desert Spring – Requirement 230 Soldiers)

Year 1			
90 Days	90 Days	90 Days	90 Days
Bn A	Bn B	Bn C	Bn D
Year 2			
90 Days	90 Days	90 Days	90 Days
Bn E	Bn F	Bn G	Bn H
Year 3			
90 Days	90 Days	90 Days	90 Days
Bn I	Bn J	Bn K	Bn L

TABLE 4. BATTALION ROTATION ALTERNATIVE

In order to manage the mobilization process, each State STARC headquarters would require the authority to conduct home station mobilization, versus sending their units to a Forces Command (FORSCOM) power projection platform for mobilization processing and certification. Currently, home station mobilization processing is an option available to the STARC headquarters, but it takes a special request through the CONUS Armies to gain approval authority. Until recently, FORSCOM and the CONUS Armies granted very few exceptions for home station mobilizations.

A major issue with any mobilization is the requirement for the units to deploy their unit equipment and vehicles. Under this type of deployment policy, the Army and the NGB would have the responsibility to establish and maintain standardized equipment set for each deployment site. The units would hand receipt the equipment set from the occupying force and use it throughout their deployment. Each unit would be responsible for their own personal equipment, miscellaneous supplies, and individual weapons. Crew served weapons and night vision equipment would remain as part of the standardized equipment set at the deployment location. Contract support for maintaining equipment is currently available in Bosnia, Kosovo, MFO Sinai, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, but it would require contractor support to establish the maintenance agreements and funding support.

Under current mobilization policies, two changes would be required within FORSCOM headquarters to facilitate this deployment concept. First, FORSCOM would need to develop a

pre-deployment training package that facilitates the Army National Guard's training on drill weekends and annual training. The current training packages require additional training weekends and schools. The new training packages must maximize all aspects of technology including distance learning, Internet training, Video conferencing (VTC), and interactive software, which will provide alternatives instead of adding additional weekend training sessions. The pre and post mobilization training must be restructured to eliminate redundancy and provide realistic mission oriented training. Training plans should be relevant to the mission, focused on select soldier and leader tasks, and standardized for common levels of training. Also, FORSCOM needs to reduce the Mission Requirement Exercise (MRE) for the European deployments from three-weeks into a two-week annual training package, narrowing the training focus of the tasks, allowing the STARC headquarters flexibility in conducting, supporting, and hosting the exercise.

Second, FORSCOM has delegated the training validation requirement to First and Fifth Armies to certify all soldiers' training for mobilization. Presently, no other organization has the authority except the CONUS Armies to validate mobilization training. However, under this proposed concept, FORSCOM would need to authorize the State STARC headquarters the authority to certify soldiers for mobilization. The CONUS Armies lack the personnel staffing to support multiple state deployments and personnel rotations. However, the CONUS Armies could provide evaluator training, instructor and evaluator validation, and training packages to the state STARC headquarters to ensure that standardization occurs between the STARC headquarters. In addition, if this deployment concept is going to be successful, the "Total Force" must trust the validation process, provide the organizations the authority and responsibility to make it happen, and then hold them accountable.

Another issue requiring DoD's attention is the need to change the minimum rotation lengths for personnel serving in contingency operations. Each Combatant Commander has the responsibility to determine the length of deployments for Army National Guard soldiers and units. Presently, both U.S. European Command (EUCOM) and U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) have set minimum rotation lengths that are different for personnel and units. CENTCOM requires that individual personnel serve at least 120 days and units a minimum of 90 days, but prefers units serve 120-179-day rotations. EUCOM requires individuals to serve in 90-day rotations, while units serve a minimum of 29 days.

A major issue with any mobilization is the transportation of soldiers and equipment into and out of theater. Under this type of deployment concept, DoD and U.S. Transportation Command (TRANSCOM) would require a shift from a conventional planning process to a

collaborative planning process, which focuses on placing the right aircraft assets against the task, and frees up aircraft for other missions. The key to collaborative planning is the early involvement of TRANSCOM into the process. By scheduling the deployment rotations out 3 years, TRANSCOM has the ability to adequately meet their “Deployment-50” standard for assigning aircraft to missions within 50 days prior to deployment. Since the Combatant Commanders are responsible for assigning priorities to aircraft missions, they could influence the planning process by requesting aircraft over a long-range calendar. Finally, under the collaboration process, it provides TRANSCOM with the flexibility, optimizes the aircraft assets, and reduces cost.

Finally, many of DoD’s mobilization policies and deployment benefits which cover SSC deployments for soldiers and families would require restructuring to meet the change in current mobilization laws. However, with a consolidated effort by the Office of Reserve Affairs, (ESGR) and Congress, they could force changes in the legislation required to make this concept successful.

ADVANTAGES

Advantages of the 90-day rotation policy are numerous. First, it provides the National Guard with flexibility to manage and structure their deployments. This type of policy would provide predictability to rotations while standardizing Army and Army National Guard tours of duty. In effect, the policy would enable more individuals to rotate in and out of theater more frequently, increasing the number of soldiers who would serve in a SSC deployment. In addition, the larger pool of ARNG soldiers would also relieve some of the stress on Army personnel currently serving in SSC operations, and lowering their attrition rates. The 90-day window would lead to a substantial reduction in operation tempo by taking full advantage of the contributions made by the “Total Force” Army, Army Reserve, and Army National Guard by integrating all the components into cohesive deployable force packages.

The long-term deployment calendar would provide the STARCs, division headquarters, ESBs, and other units with a tentative timeline to build their pre-deployment training deployment plan. Currently, NGB notifies units between one to two years out from mobilization and many times it falls into the near-term training plans for weekend and annual training, negativity impacting all levels of command, including soldiers, families and employers. However, the 90-day deployment concept would provide the long-term solution that would allow the commands the ability to build training plans to maximize their weekend and annual training days, without losing training funding, resources, and time.

Soldiers would be able to provide a long-range deployment notice to employers and families. The schedule provides soldiers, their families and employers with the required information to prepare and make plans. The notice would also give the employer the information necessary to work out employment schedules and replacement workers, ultimately reducing the stress caused by lengthy deployments. The shorter duration deployments reduce the long-term negative impacts caused by the absence of a key employee and possibly may reduce the formal complaints filed between the soldier and their employers as a result of military deployments. Employers are more willing to support Army National Guard deployments if they can get advance notice of over 30 days, shorter deployment windows, and fewer repeat rotations over several years.

The 90-day deployment option would help stabilize the demand for high demand personnel and provide predictability in the rotation period. The shorter deployment window would help reduce potential impacts on unit readiness and OPTEMPO. Instead of mobilizing units under the Derivative Unit Identification Code (DUIC) with only volunteer soldiers, the NGB would mobilize the entire unit's Unit Identification Code, any personnel not deploying would transfer to another unit. This would eliminate reductions in personnel and equipment readiness from multiple units in order to achieve the required mobilization standard for one unit.

NGB could establish a deployment working group composed of leaders, soldiers, directorates (both AC and RC) who have experience of planning or deploying soldiers to the different SSCs. Family support coordinators and ESGR representatives could augment the working group and provide valuable information to the process and reduce the tension in these critical areas. This working group would be responsible for lessons learned from previous deployments and developing recommendations for changes to the deployment concept, regulations, and legislation. The ultimate goal of this working group is the development of a comprehensive deployment plan that would reduce or eliminate the barriers to implementing this 90-day concept.

Another advantage for the unit leadership is their ability to regulate the deployment window for select personnel within the 90-day deployment cycle. In cases where civilian medical and other professional occupations cannot afford to deploy for long durations, they now can deploy on a case-by-case basis. Another option is to deploy professional soldiers for short duration deployments using a 15-day annual training period using overseas deployment training (ODT) funds to support the mission.

Finally, a 90-day deployment cycle provides the Army leadership with a management tool that is flexible to react to changes in required personnel numbers, mission duration, and scope.

Currently, the Bosnia deployment has steadily dropped by an average of 600-soldier requirements every six months. Usually, the soldiers feel the impact of these personnel changes after they have already left their families and employers. Nevertheless, the shorter deployment window allows the leadership the opportunity to make immediate changes to future rotations, without impact on the current rotation. The political leadership has the ability to change the rotation four times during a year, versus two times with current six-month policy. This change is significant to the credibility of the Army, National Guard with the soldiers, families and employers.

DISADVANTAGES

Instituting the 90-day rotation policy would also have some significant disadvantages. Shortening the minimum rotational requirement so personnel maybe moved in and out of theater more quickly may not be more efficient because of the required pre-deployment training requirements. It may be more cost-effective to keep soldiers in theater for a longer deployment than to deploy them for only a few months. Under the Air Force's AEF concept, personnel operate from bases outside of the direct area of most SSC operations, and therefore, do not have to invest as much time in predeployment preparations. Their ability to move personnel in and out of theater more quickly is one of their advantages.

Shortening the rotational requirements makes the management of SSCs more complicated for the Theater Combatant Commanders. Under the ESB and battalion concept, the combatant commander would be transitioning to a different headquarters every 90-days. In many deployments, it takes the deploying headquarters approximately 60-90 days to settle into the normal rotation and work through issues. Combatant commanders will not support the constant movement of forces into theater without DoD directing the change in mobilization policies.

The increased movement of soldiers and equipment in and out of theater makes transportation management extremely difficult and causes significant turbulence in Timed Phased Force Deployment Data (TPFDD). The TRANSCOM would have to mission a group of aircraft on a frequent rotation schedule to support this deployment cycle. Since the majority of unit equipment would remain in country, the primary focus for transportation is the movement of soldiers. This movement of personnel could occur every 15, 30, 60, and 90 days and require TRANSCOM movement planners to schedule additional aircraft planning conferences to align transportation assets with the movement of soldiers or change to the above described collaborative system of planning.

Since soldiers are deploying from their home state and not from a FORSCOM power projection platform (PPP), the transportation assets would be using a variety of ANG, USAFR bases, and civilian airports to stage soldier movements. Many of these facilities do not have the equipment or capability to provide the logistical requirements necessary to support a deployment. Potential costs associated with refueling and repairing aircraft using contract civilian fuel and maintenance support could substantially increase the overhead cost of deployments. Finally, in the event of a world crisis, the Army would divert aircraft away from the SSC deployment mission, causing the leadership tremendous difficulty in maintaining the rotation schedule and mission continuity.

From the perspective of costs, deploying soldiers for a shorter duration and increasing the number of units would increase the cost of the deployments. Increased costs are largely associated from the pre-mobilization preparation, training, active duty pay, logistics, and transportation. Currently, the average contingency operation cost for a unit going to ODS is approximately \$2.4M, which includes all of the pre-mobilization administration, medical, logistical, training, and support personnel for 230 soldiers going on two six-month deployments.⁸⁰ Under the proposed concept, the costs may double to \$4.8M, not including the increased transportation and active duty pay during the overlap periods between rotations. However, these higher costs need to be balanced against the costs of recruiting new soldiers. The benefits may be dramatically greater than the disadvantages. Probable benefits include increased retention, higher recruitment rates, and increased readiness. Currently, it costs approximately \$60-70K to recruit and train a new soldier. It is obvious that soldiers who get treated well according to their personal circumstances will be more likely to stay in the Army National Guard than soldiers who are faced to go on a six-month rotation that negatively impacts their business, employer or family. It is less expensive to retain quality soldiers who are trained, familiar with the unit, and part of a team, than to start with a new recruit.

Finally, changing the culture is one of the hardest tasks for any organization to undertake. The process involves a multi-part approach over time to build the teamwork and trust that is required for any organization. The Army National Guard will be challenged to maintain the demanding standards for deployment within the limited time constraints that they normally take.

Teamwork is never easy and by delegating the home station mobilization authority, training validation, and mobilization standardization to the State STARC headquarters will create even bigger challenges. However, the Army has the capacity to overcome those challenges by training the STARC headquarters in their new mobilization and training role.

Habitual associations and integration between the Army and the Army National Guard will be required to ease the entire process.

CONCLUSION

“The most important military problem is to devise means of preparing great armies of citizen soldiers to meet the emergency of modern war.”

—John Mc Auley Palmer

Great strides have been achieved in integrating the Army and Army National Guard forces into the “Army of One.” From the Vietnam War, when the two forces were completely separate to combined joint operations during Operation Desert Storm, the message is clear that the Army and the Army National Guard must continue to integrate in order to remain an effective fighting force for the future.

Former Secretary of Defense Laird commented on the Total Force Policy success, “It has been the personal commitment of every citizen soldier that has turned the Total Force concept into what it has become today, the foundation of America’s security posture.”⁸¹

The role of the Army National Guard in the 21st century is to continue to demonstrate a willingness and ability to support future mobilizations and SSC deployments. Small-scale contingencies and mobilizations for major theater wars will continue to be a priority for the Army National Guard in the near-term. The Army National Guard will remain a significant contributor to the nation’s defense as a “Total Force” partner. The thirty-two-year old “Total Force” policy is as relevant today as it was during its inception in 1973. However, to support the intent of the policy, the Army and Army National Guard must continue to work together to solve the difficult issues. The challenge for the Army National Guard and the Army is to balance the mission, structure, and resourcing of its components for future SSC operations.

Greater flexibility in the management of deployments and soldiers is necessary to reduce family and employer issues. Former Secretary of Defense William J. Perry said, “In the future, Guardsmen will play a larger role and America must remember that actual and potential sacrifices Guardsmen make to serve their nation. The American people must be ready to support Guardsmen, their families, and their employers in the greater role they will play in American defense.”⁸² Accessing the Army National Guard for small-scale contingency operations will require innovation and an improved culture inside of the Army and the Army National Guard. The 90-day deployment concept holds great promise for the Army National Guard and the Army. Through this deployment concept, the Army National Guard can provide the Combatant Commander with trained-to-task forces, while adding predictability and stability

to the lives of our soldiers, their families and employers. This paper proposed a deployment concept that the Army National Guard and Army can use as it works to properly structure, resource, and manage small-scale contingencies for the future operating environment, as well as being better able to perform its state supported missions during times of emergency and to the nation in times of war.

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GLOSSARY

AC/RC	Active Component/Reserve Component
AEF	Air Expeditionary Force
ANG	Air National Guard
ARNG	Army National Guard
BUR	Bottom-up Review
CENTCOM	Central Command
CONUS	Continental United States
CS	Combat Support
CSA	Chief of Staff Army
CSS	Combat Service Support
DOD	Department of Defense
DPG	Defense Planning Guidance
DUIC	Derivative Unit Identification Code
ESB	Enhanced Separate Brigade
ESGR	Employer Support for the Guard and Reserve
EUCOM	European Command
FORSCOM	Forces Command
HD/LD	High Demand/Low Density
JCS	Joint Chief of Staff
JE	Joint Endeavor
JF	Joint Forge
JG	Joint Guardian
MFO	Multi-National Force Observers
MOB	Mobilization
MRC	Major Regional Conflict
MRE	Mission Rehearsal Exercise
MTOE	Modified Table of Organization and Equipment
MTW	Major Theater of War
NBC	Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical
NCO	Non-Commission Officer
NDP	National Defense Panel
NGB	National Guard Bureau
NMS	National Military Strategy
NSS	National Security Strategy
OCONUS	Overseas Continental United States
ODS	Operation Desert Spring
ODT	Overseas Deployment Training
OPTEMPO	Operational Tempo
PERSTEMPO	Personnel Tempo
PPP	Power Projection Platform
PRC	Presidential Reserve Call-up
PSC	Presidential Select Call-up
PSRC	Presidential Select Reserve Call-up
QDR	Quadrennial Defense Review
RCE-05	Reserve Employment Study 2005
SSC	Rights Act
STARC	Small Scale Contingency
TPFDD	State Area Command
	Time Phased Forces Deployment Data

TRANSCOM
UIC
USAFR
USAR
USCGR
USERRA
USNR
USR
VTC
WOT

Transportation Command
Unit Identification Code
United States Air Force Reserve
United States Army Reserve
United States Coast Guard Reserve
Uniform Services Employment and Reemployment
United States Naval Reserve
Unit Status Report
Video Telecommunications Conference
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